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Surprised	by	Science:	The	“Original	Errors”	of	Paradise	Lost	
 MICHAEL	SLATER	
 
 
 
hat can it mean to be surprised by science in Paradise Lost? Some 
scholars have been surprised to discover that Milton, a radical in so 
many other respects, appears decidedly backward in his scientific 
positions and commitments.1 Some have been intrigued by the close association 
between Satan’s legion of fallen angels and a new industrial technology, not unlike 
that which was sweeping through London in the seventeenth century.2 Still others 
have been intrigued by the plurality of worlds Milton seems ready to entertain, at 
least in theory.3 While all these topics represent worthy critical investments, none 
adequately captures the sense of surprise this essay will investigate. To be surprised 
by science in Paradise Lost, I will argue, entails something like what Stanley Fish so 
famously described in 1967, a series of interactions between text and reader 
carefully designed to enthrall us, to remind us of our own complicity in the 
narrative presently unfolding.4 In the context of original sin, this surprise involves 
being reminded, more or less gently, that we have fallen for Satan’s trap, that we 
have been seduced—not unlike Eve in Book 9—by his dazzling rhetoric and 
charm. In the context of science, this surprise involves being reminded that we 
continue to repeat the same “original errors” as our first parents on earth. 
Since Surprised by Sin first appeared, critics have mounted a variety of 
responses to it. Some have taken issue with its method, some with its conclusions.5 
But the text remains indispensable for Milton scholars today. As many as three 
decades after its initial appearance, John Rumrich could still characterize its 
argument as the dominant paradigm within which studies of Paradise Lost operate, 
regardless of the various critical methods they ostensibly employ.6 In the context 
of Milton’s approach to science in particular, Fish intervened in what was 
becoming an increasingly common view—that Milton adopts a fundamentally 
classical and medieval perspective. For Fish, Milton rejects certain elements of the 
“new science” to be sure, but no more than he rejects medieval science, too. What 
seems so problematic in Paradise Lost, according to Fish, is the very attempt to 
attain knowledge about things deemed by God “too high” for mortal minds.  
 In the midst of efforts to recuperate Milton’s attitude toward early 
modern science, critics have routinely challenged elements of Surprised by Sin, 
whether directly or indirectly. Whereas for Fish Satan functions in Paradise Lost as 
a clear and problematic embodiment of empiricist epistemologies, for Daniel Fried 
he represents instead a “perverted” empiricism, to be contrasted with Milton’s 
own allegiance to its “truer” form.7 Against Fish’s claim that Eve falls largely as a 
product of her devotion to experience, Karen Edwards argues in Milton and the 
W 
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Natural World that her fall arises mostly because she fails to live up to the rigorous 
empirical standards of Milton’s contemporaries like Robert Boyle.8 As with Fried’s 
account of Satan, Eve represents for Edwards a corrupt empiricism Milton finally 
discounts. And far from disavowing the revelations of the “new astronomy” as 
Fish claims, Milton, according to Catherine Gimelli Martin, instead displays a clear 
“preference for the elegant rationality of the Copernican side of the argument.”9 
“In the cosmology of Paradise Lost,” Harinder Singh Marjara writes somewhat 
more cautiously, “heliocentrism is present in the spirit if not in the letter.”10 
Whether Milton was of Galileo’s party, and to what extent he knew it, continues 
to present readers with an interpretive dilemma.   
 My focus here is concerned somewhat less with deciphering Milton’s 
particular scientific investments than with how he deploys scientific arguments 
and narrative structures throughout Paradise Lost. In the decades since Fish 
transformed the critical landscape by realizing the unique rhetorical effect of 
Milton’s text, scholars in the history of science have similarly underscored the 
central importance of narrative technique for the development of a new empirical 
program in the seventeenth century.11 This emphasis has two effects for how we 
read the status of science in Paradise Lost. On the one hand, to be an “empiricist” 
in the modern sense means more than valuing experience as the root of all 
knowledge.12 As Peter Dear and other historians have noted, experience was just 
as crucial to the deductive program of Aristotelian science. To distinguish between 
an older paradigm and the “new science” of the seventeenth century, what matters 
is how experience gets construed and the kinds of experiences that count. Too 
frequently, discussions of Satan and empiricism fail to account for the different 
role experience plays for the “old science” and the “new,” and consequently to 
distinguish adequately between deductive and inductive programs. As I detail in 
the final section, Milton’s Satan displays a commitment to a decisively modern 
form of experience, one that fails him spectacularly. He does not, as critics have 
claimed, pervert empiricism in Paradise Lost. Instead, empiricism perverts his faith 
in God. 
On the other hand, attention to the narrative forms of scientific argument 
primes us to consider the shape of Milton’s examples with special care. This 
consideration certainly involves the kind of argument Fish has already made, 
noting the double rhetorical structure of enticement and reproach as it pertains 
specifically to our desire for knowledge. But it also involves another element 
somewhat less noticed in this context. Paradise Lost, I argue, overtly presents both 
Adam and Satan as archetypes for the errors endemic to the dominant modes of 
science in the seventeenth century—Adam as an archetype of the new astronomer, 
Satan as the new empiricist more broadly. Despite all the emphasis on innovation 
underlying the “new science” in its various forms (astronomy, empiricism, 
mechanism, etc.), Milton implies there is nothing terribly new there at all. In what 
amounts almost to an inversion of typological exegesis, Milton’s text works back 
from the philosophy of his age, embodied by figures like Galileo and Bacon, to 
find the root of its errors in the first examples of scientific thought.  
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“Already by thy reasoning”: Adam and the Archetypal Error of 
Astronomy  
Heav’n is for thee too high 
To know what passes there; be lowly wise: 
Think only what concerns thee and thy being; 
Dream not of other Worlds, what Creatures there 
Live, in what state, condition, or degree, 
Contented that thus far hath been reveal’d 
Not of Earth only but of Highest Heav’n. (8.172-78)13 
 
 
Dream not of other worlds, Raphael sternly instructs Adam. Couched amidst his 
notoriously evasive discussion of cosmology, Raphael proffers a principle of 
Socratic humility: to be lowly wise. He cautions Adam to recognize the limits of 
his perspective, since heaven is “too high” for human comprehension. But even 
as he abjures lofty speculations, Raphael persistently redirects Adam’s gaze upward 
to the heavens, to the very “worlds” he hopes—ostensibly at least—to bar from 
the imagination. Immediately upon warning that the “great Architect” did “wisely 
to conceal, and not divulge / His secrets,” Raphael invites Adam to consider a 
number of competing cosmological theories, from the “thwart obliquities” of the 
Ptolemaic model to the “three different motions” of earth in the Copernican (8.72-
74, 133, 130). His initial dismissal of “heavenly conjecture” is thus followed, as 
Annabel Patterson notes, by “a series of hypotheses that admit Adam into that 
same conjectural discourse. Three times he encourages Adam to think what if. That 
is to say, to engage in scientific hypothesis.”14 Dream not, he says, but do consider 
this. 
 If Raphael’s cosmological lecture leaves Adam ultimately uncertain as to 
the nature of the heavens, it has left critics equally perplexed about the place of 
scientific investigation in Milton’s narrative. For an older generation of critics, this 
lecture and others like it cemented Milton’s scientific “backwardness,” his refusal 
to accept the (obviously true) propositions of the “new astronomy” instituted 
theoretically by Copernicus and demonstrated factually by Galileo.15 Others, 
however, have worked to recuperate Milton’s attitude toward science in Paradise 
Lost, emphasizing against his alleged backwardness Milton’s considerable 
knowledge of contemporary scientific issues and his generally progressive 
response.16 That we continue to debate Milton’s scientific alliances seems to me 
symptomatic of the puzzling inconsistencies scattered throughout Paradise Lost. 
Raphael warns against cosmic speculations only to invite Adam to partake in them. 
Galileo holds a place of unparalleled honor as the only contemporary directly 
named in the text, and yet Milton apparently dismisses his telescopic observations 
as “less assured” and “imagined” (5.262-63). And even if Raphael does in fact 
subtly betray a preference for the heliocentric hypothesis in Book 8, Uriel, an angel 
of “unsurpassed sight,” describes a cosmos definitively Aristotelian five books 
earlier (3.694-735). How can readers, both early modern and modern, reconcile 
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these discrepancies? Amid the many competing pictures and theories represented 
in Paradise Lost, where does Milton’s allegiance lie?  
 My aim is partly to substitute a different question, not least because this 
one by all appearances stubbornly resists any clear answer. I am less interested 
here in how to resolve the apparent tension between Raphael’s advice and his 
practice, or between his two cosmic schemes, than I am in the conflict itself, its 
very presence in the narrative. Why does Raphael encourage, even as he forbids 
and rebukes, Adam’s contemplation of the heavens? That rhetorical pattern by 
this point is familiar to nearly all of Milton’s readers. As he does in other contexts, 
Milton will consistently elaborate a scientific dispute only to remind us, as it were, 
of its fruitlessness—or perhaps more accurately of its “fruit-fullness,” its origin in 
and/or relation to an act gluttonous consumption. In Paradise Lost, the Ptolemaic 
and Copernican depictions of heaven both suffer reproach, rivals more in their 
vanity than in their accuracy. If, as Peter Herman notes, a persistent need to 
reconcile what appear to be contradictions in the poem largely defines the history 
of Milton criticism, in this particular case that need is precisely what is under 
assault.17 Adam yearns to resolve the nature of the heavens, to determine which 
of two competing possibilities more accurately reflects their reality. Raphael warns 
in response that certainty and resolution, however desirable, lie inveterately 
beyond Adam’s reach. His dialogue in Book 8, far from demonstrating any clear 
preference for one position or the other, stages the history of astronomical debate 
as a caricature of Adam’s fundamental errors in reasoning. 
The specific content of that dialogue is less significant than its frame(s), 
at least inasmuch as it might reveal how scientific reasoning gets deployed in 
Paradise Lost. Raphael’s brief sketch of the two dominant and as yet undecided 
cosmic models sits conspicuously amongst not one, nor even two or three, but 
four rebukes, with Adam contributing a fifth himself.18 Just as Milton often warns 
readers both before and after Satan speaks of the arch-tempter’s hypocrisy, 
Raphael warns Adam doubly (or quadruply) of the dangers lurking in astronomical 
science. We do well to remember that the explicit purpose of the angel’s visit is to 
“admonish”—in the double sense of to caution and to reprimand—Adam and Eve 
about the dangers of temptation and transgression. Altogether Raphael divides 
roughly sixty-eight lines between the different scientific models he describes, with 
another sixty-one lines devoted to admonitions.19 The dialogue in Book 8 thus 
places at least as much weight on the latter as the former. When we consider that 
it discourages astronomical speculation at nearly twice the length it devotes to any 
single paradigm, that weight appears to shift a good deal more.  
We have been disinclined as modern readers to believe that Raphael 
carefully designs his disputation, as he claims, only to quell Adam’s speculations, 
rather than to urge any particular position.20 But given the evidence, this may have 
more to do with our own scientific investments than with his. We tend to marshal 
Raphael’s dialogue either to fault Milton for his failure to accept the new 
Copernican science or to praise him for embracing it. From the perspective of 
Paradise Lost, however, our desire to judge Milton’s account of the heavens against 
reality is itself a condition of the fall inherited from Adam. Our desire reflects his. 
We presume to know the nature of the heavens, just as Adam had presumed. By 
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our need to resolve a question left painfully open in the text, we commit the same 
“crime” that is the primary source of Raphael’s dialogue, at least for Milton: we 
reach “too high.”   
Adam’s astronomical conjectures at this point in Book 8 are not yet a 
product of fallen knowledge, to be sure. They are, nonetheless, bound up in the 
temptation to fall. Eve’s violation of God’s law will eventually transpire because 
of her ambition to acquire knowledge deemed too high—a height that Satan, at 
least, figures explicitly in terms of astronomy. Characterizing his alleged 
transformation upon eating the fruit, the serpent claims that  
 
Thenceforth to speculations high or deep 
I turned my thoughts, and with capacious mind 
Considered all things visible in heaven, 
Or earth, or middle, all things fair and good. (9.602-05; emphasis  
mine) 
 
When the serpent later promises the fruit will allow Eve “not only to discern / 
Things in their causes, but to trace the ways / Of highest agents,” the knowledge 
he evokes is astronomical: to traces the ways, or motions, of “things visible in 
heaven” (9.681-83). The fall, despite Eve’s transgression in this specific historical 
moment, is only the fulfillment of an ambition already latent in Adam’s 
“speculations high.” Her desire to ingest the fruit’s “sciential sap” serves as the 
final realization of Adam’s “thirst for knowledge,” a thirst he describes explicitly in 
the midst of his conversation with Raphael (8.8). If Adam does not share in Eve’s 
culpability for that first bite, he at the very least shares in her desire. And so too 
do we, according to Milton.  
 That we share in this desire is one of the overarching implications of 
Paradise Lost, the demonstration of which is also one of its principal rhetorical 
effects. Raphael condemns the future dispute between cosmological paradigms as 
the height of vanity, a struggle to know the nature of the heavens as fruitless as it 
is proud (8.75-79). Perhaps most significantly, he positions that dispute as the 
logical result of Adam’s original mistake, as if Galileo’s new astronomy is only the 
latest in a long string of errors that reverberates through history. Raphael explicitly 
depicts Adam as a type for Galileo and other seventeenth-century innovators, who 
continue to repeat the original errors of the former by an even more pronounced 
presumption of knowledge, a presumption made especially possible by the 
telescope. “Already by thy reasoning this I guess,” Raphael reproaches Adam (8.85-
86; emphasis mine). What the angel guesses so prophetically, with the benefit of 
Milton’s hindsight, implicates both the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 
astronomers: 
 
    how they will wield 
 The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive 
 To save appearances, how gird the sphere 
 With centric and eccentric scribbled o’er 
 Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb: 
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 Already by thy reasoning this I guess, 
 Who art to lead thy offspring, and suppos’st 
 That bodies bright and greater should not serve 
 The less not bright, nor heaven such journeys run, 
 Earth sitting still, when she alone receives 
 The benefit… (8.80-90) 
 
Raphael’s condemnation exhibits a carefully crafted symmetry, attributing blame 
equally to both propositions. While beginning with a caricature of the Ptolemaic 
model, “With centric and eccentric scribbled o’er / Cycle and epicycle,” it shifts 
suddenly and unexpectedly—i.e., surprisingly—to a curt dismissal of the 
Copernican. Upon our first reading, we assume that Raphael marks the Ptolemaic 
scheme as the epitome of Adam’s fallacious reasoning in Eden, and rightly so. The 
colon that follows his description of that scheme in line 84 (“orb in orb:”) leads 
us to associate the two thoughts, as though this in line 85 has for its antecedent 
everything that preceded it in lines 80 to 84. That’s how colons work. But as 
Raphael continues, a shift in systems jars our reading experience. Adam’s fallacious 
reasoning actually supposes, we learn, “That bodies bright and greater [i.e., the 
sun] should not serve / The less not bright [i.e., earth], nor heaven such journeys 
run, / Earth sitting still.” This is a central assumption driving the Copernican 
philosophers—that the earth itself might move with far more simplicity than the 
heavens. The point is not that Raphael predominately faults this latter scheme, but 
that he faults both. The dispute itself, Raphael surmises, will serve only to provoke 
God’s laughter at their “quaint opinions wide” (8.78). 
 Between the third and fourth rebukes in Raphael’s dialogue, from lines 
122 to 166, we find perhaps the most detailed description of the current state of 
astronomy in Milton’s narrative. It includes allusions to Gilbert and Kepler, to 
Copernicus and Galileo, and to profoundly new concepts like “earthshine.” The 
angel begins by evoking Kepler, particularly his conception of the sun’s “attractive 
virtue,” which had relied heavily upon Gilbert’s work on the lodestone. “What if 
the sun be centre to the world,” Raphael asks, “and other stars / By his attractive 
virtue … dance about him various rounds?” (8.122-25). In his Astronomia Nova 
(1609) and in the second edition to his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1621), Kepler 
aimed to demonstrate a causal relation between the sun’s rotation and the 
planetary orbits, which he eventually located in the sun’s “virtue.”21 As he continues 
to expound this heliocentric hypothesis, Raphael accumulates additional 
developments from the new astronomy, both theoretical and observational: he 
refers to the earth’s “three different motions” (8.129-30), a central tenet in 
Copernicus; to the “terrestrial moon” famously observed by Galileo’s “glazed 
optic tube” (8.142); and to Galileo’s argument that earth, like all planets, reflects 
light from the sun (8.140-44).   
 Galileo considered this last point an important contribution for denying 
any essential difference between the terrestrial and the celestial bodies. The latter 
did not shine by their own internal light, he argued, but by reflecting light from 
the sun. If the earth similarly reflected light, we have no reason to assume it to be 
any different in nature from the moon or other planets. He claimed to observe the 
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effects of this reflection in the moon, as he explains in The Dialogue Concerning the 
Two Chief World Systems (1632): 
 
just as the moon supplies us with the light we lack from the sun a 
great part of the time, and by reflection of its rays makes the nights 
fairly bright, so the earth repays it by reflecting the solar rays when 
the moon most needs them, giving a very strong illumination—as 
much greater than what the moon gives us … as the surface of the 
earth is greater than that of the moon.22 
 
In his dialogue in Paradise Lost, Raphael explicitly contemplates the broader 
implications of this future and highly specific claim. The Ptolemaic model, he 
urges,  
 
       needs not thy belief, 
 If Earth industrious of herself fetch Day 
 Travelling East, and with her part averse 
 From the Sun’s beam meet Night, her other part 
 Still luminous by his ray. What if that light 
Sent from her through the wide transpicuous air, 
To the terrestrial Moon be as a Star 
Enlightening her by Day, as she by Night 
This Earth? (8.136-44; emphasis mine) 
 
The syntax is a bit murky, but the implication is clear. Raphael consistently uses 
the masculine pronoun throughout his discussion to refer to the sun, and the 
feminine to refer to the earth and moon. What if the light sent from her (the earth) 
to the “terrestrial moon” is like that of a star, shining for her (the moon) by day in 
the same way that she (the moon) reflects light to earth by evening? When Raphael 
claims to anticipate the whole history of astronomy in Adam’s high speculations, 
Milton ensures that he gets it right, up to and including these recent developments 
by Galileo and his peers. 
Even as the “new astronomy” certainly dominates this discussion in 
Raphael’s dialogue, it suffers from the rebukes that frame it no more or less than 
the old astronomy. “Whether thus these things, or whether not,” Raphael 
concludes his discussion,  
 
 Whether the sun predominant in heaven 
 Rise on earth, or earth rise on the sun, 
 He from the east his flaming road begin, 
 Or she from west her silent course advance 
 … 
 Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid, 
 Leave them to God above… 
…heaven is for thee too high 
 To know what passes there. (8.159-73; emphasis mine) 
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If the new astronomy receives the bulk of Raphael’s attention, this final 
summation serves neither as a subtle endorsement nor as a more thorough 
censure, as his final summation is careful to note. Such “discoveries” as these 
merely represent the pinnacle of astronomical “achievement” in Milton’s age, and 
so stand as the final—but by no means best or worst—instantiations of Adam’s 
error.  
  The rhetorical pattern established by Raphael’s dialogue, wherein an 
auditor (or reader) is simultaneously encouraged and rebuked for his cosmic 
speculations, occurs frequently in Paradise Lost. Nearly all of the overt references 
to Galileo contain some deep-seated ambiguity, which helps to explain the critical 
controversy surrounding his presence in the text.23 One of these, in Book 3, 
famously provides Fish with a classic example of rhetorical surprise. For him, the 
Galileo similes function as “a preparation for the moment in Book VIII when 
Adam responds to Raphael’s astronomical dissertation: ‘To whom thus Adam 
clear’d of doubt.’”24 We are surprised by that summation, since the dialogue seems 
to have raised more questions than it has answered. But we are also prepared for 
that response, Fish argues: “He is cleared of doubt, not because he now knows 
how the universe is constructed, but because he knows that he cannot know.”25 
What links this moment to so many others in the text is not just rhetorical surprise, 
but an unyielding indecision—an inability, Milton insists, to finally decide in 
matters of science. Despite our best efforts, speculation cannot aspire to 
knowledge. For Milton, the most recent “advances” in astronomical science, as I 
hope to have shown, serve only as echoes of Adam’s “quaint opinions wide” 
(8.78). And if Adam provides a type for all subsequent astronomers, their errors 
only a repetition of his, the scientific dilemma he faces also models an overarching 
problem endemic to empirical investigation. Astronomy is only one embodiment 
of a broader speciousness in the text, one that incorporates not only Adam and 
Galileo but Satan as well. 
 
 
The Arch-tempter, Satan: An Archetypal Experiment 
 
Satan is certainly a perplexing figure in Paradise Lost, a mouthpiece for ideas and 
attitudes shared by many of Milton’s contemporaries—indeed, according to some, 
by Milton himself. Among other things, he has been linked to revolutionary 
politics and radical egalitarianism, to an emergent mechanism or industrialism, to 
seventeenth-century philosophers like Hobbes and Descartes, and, more 
generally, to the new empirical reliance on experimentation.26 Satan’s associations 
with Galileo have also been well documented, if not entirely resolved.27 The main 
question in such cases is whether Satan perverts or exemplifies these associations, 
and as a corollary whether the text valorizes or condemns the attitudes involved. 
Despite the moral judgment we expect to find implicitly attached to Satan, these 
issues admit no easy answers.   
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 My concern here is principally with experimentation, both its specific 
relation to the “tempter,” one of Satan’s most common epithets, and its general 
standing for Milton. The systematic program of experimentation we now 
inevitably associate with modern science, whereby an investigator forms a 
hypothesis, conducts an experiment (or series of experiments), and draws 
appropriate conclusions, was still under development in the latter part of the 
seventeenth century.28 As a mode of investigation, experimentalism received some 
form of official sanction only a decade or so before Milton published his text, with 
the arrival of the Royal Society in 1660. But even the institutionalization of 
experimental science was no sure sign of its success, as Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer have persuasively shown. Not all of the new scientists—much less the 
“old” ones—were convinced about the virtues of experimentation. Hobbes, in 
particular, delivered a series of trenchant critiques throughout the 1660s and 1670s 
regarding the assumptions and methods of “the Greshamites,” as he referred to 
members of the Royal Society.29 It is in the midst of this contest over scientific 
legitimacy, by no means settled, that Paradise Lost emerges, and with it Milton’s 
portrayal of the grand experimenter Satan. 
 There can be little doubt that Milton makes of Satan an advocate for 
experiential knowledge. “By proof to try” becomes something of a motto for the 
fallen angels, and certainly Satan urges the value of experience to manipulate Eve 
in Book 9. With the exception of Milton’s poetic invocation, the very first thing a 
reader encounters in Paradise Lost is a conversation between Satan and Beelzebub 
about their failed “experiment” in heaven. “[S]o much the stronger proved / He 
with his thunder,” Satan claims, “and till then who knew / The force of those dire 
arms” (1.92-94). As the conclusion of lines 92 and 93 underscores, Satan posits an 
essential bond between proof and knowledge. To really know the force of God’s 
might, one must test it, just as he will advise before the battle in Book 5. Even 
Satan’s name may have suggested for Milton his connection to experimentation. 
For many of the new philosophers, the highest model of investigation was a kind 
of experiment Bacon had labeled “lucifera,” those that have no purpose but to 
discover causes and axioms.30 Among members of the Royal Society, “luciferous” 
thus became a common adjective to describe their experiments.31 And although 
Milton rarely uses the name “Lucifer,” he does so for the first time, significantly, 
just as Satan formulates his experimental designs in heaven, his plot “by proof to 
try / Who is our equal” (5.865-66).32  
While the associations between “Lucifer” and experimentation may 
appear somewhat tenuous, Milton reinforces Satan’s experimentalism with 
another name he routinely provides as an epithet, the “tempter.” To “tempt” can 
carry a host of meanings in the seventeenth century, as Daniel Fried notes. 
“Temptation is to put to the test,” he writes, “to try, to attempt (a cognate Milton 
often puts in close proximity to tempt and Tempter). It can mean, following the Latin 
root temptare, ‘to attack.’ It can even carry the force of ‘to experiment.’”33 In the 
earliest events of Paradise Lost, Satan has conflated all of these meanings in a single 
grand experiment: with his attack in heaven, he tempts his fellow angels to test the 
might (and ultimately the wrath) of God. He forms a clear hypothesis—that God 
has not created the angels and has no real power over them—and sets about to 
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test it, to prove by experimental war whether the angels shall approach the throne 
of God “beseeching or besieging” (5.869). Having failed, he even projects his own 
temptation onto God, who, Satan claims, by concealing his strength “tempted our 
attempt, and wrought our fall” (1.642). For an experimentalist like Lucifer, 
“temptation” is a modus operandi.  
 Satan is not the only character in Paradise Lost to proffer the value of 
experience, nor is it any experience he values. He advocates a particular kind of 
experience, one that had only just gained prominence in the seventeenth century.34 
In one of the most pivotal scenes of the text, the debate between Satan and Abdiel 
before the war in heaven, Milton illustrates two profoundly different notions of 
experience. If Satan’s name and epithet both suggest for readers his relation to 
experimentation, Abdiel’s signifies instead his unyielding faith in God. “Abdiel” 
literally means “servant of God,” a duty he demonstrates in Milton’s text against 
overwhelming opposition. He only is “faithful found, / Among the faithless, 
faithful only he … unmoved / Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified” (5.896-99). We 
might be tempted, given the degree to which Milton marks it, to regard Abdiel’s 
“unshaken faith” as the epistemic counterpart to an insistence on experience. 
Satan’s skeptical argument that none can truly know God’s role as the creator since 
none has experience of creation (“who saw when this creation was?”) has no effect 
on Abdiel, but we would be mistaken to assume, as Satan does, that his faith is 
therefore blind. Faith in God is axiomatic for Abdiel, a first principle from which 
all subsequent reasoning proceeds. But even so, it is grounded in experience. 
Against Satan’s heresies, Abdiel counters that 
 
 Yet by experience taught we know how good, 
 And of our good, and of our dignity 
 How provident he is, how far from thought 
 To make us less, bent rather to exalt 
 Our happy state under one head more near 
 United. (5.826-31; emphasis mine) 
 
 
From Abdiel’s unique perspective, the angels have had countless experiences to 
indicate the benevolence and omnipotence of God. It is simply not the kind of 
experience that satisfies Satan. 
 What Satan demands instead is “experimental” proof, the experience of a 
singularly contrived event that has been designed specifically to test his hypothesis. 
What separates modern empiricism from the deductive science of Aristotelian 
philosophers, as Peter Dear explains, is this different sense of how experience 
informs knowledge, not the fact that it does so. For a deductive science like 
Aristotle’s, philosophers require universal statements that can function as 
premises. Since these cannot be derived intuitively, “they must be rendered 
acceptable through appeal to experience,” as Dear notes.35 In his Opticorum libri sex 
(1613), Franciscus Anguilonius describes how experience can furnish such 
premises: 
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A single sensory act does not greatly aid in the establishment of 
sciences and the settlement of common notions, since error can 
exist which lies hidden for a single act; but having been repeated 
time and again, [the act] strengthens the judgment of truth until 
[that judgment] finally passes into common assent; whence 
afterwards they [i.e., the “common notions”] are put together, 
through reasoning, as with the first principles of a science.”36 
 
To a deductive scientist, experience is “what happens” in the everyday and the 
routine, a product of countless testimonies (of the memory and of others) that 
ultimately furnish an indisputably factual premise. A modern “experiment,” on the 
other hand, is “what happened” at a particular time and place, a singular 
spatiotemporal event that can be reported and construed so as to produce a 
knowledge claim.37 Herein lies the fundamental dissimilarity between Abdiel’s and 
Satan’s respective appeals to “experience.” For the former, the collective 
experiences of the host of angels confirm the nature of God; for the latter, a single 
test artfully designed will suffice. 
Since Fish first argued that Milton, by “making Satan an empiricist,” 
warned his readers against intellectual pride, critics have endeavored to recuperate 
the role of empirical science in Paradise Lost, just as they have also endeavored to 
recuperate Milton’s attitude toward science more broadly.38 By tracing in the 
Columbia Milton “a set of almost entirely positive references to experience,” 
Daniel Fried, for instance, makes of Milton an “implicit empiricist.”39 “Satan is the 
clearest type of empiricist who appears in any of Milton’s poetry,” he admits, but 
a “perverted empiricist, constantly experimenting through violence to determine 
the limits of divine sovereignty, and constantly refusing to acknowledge the 
resulting proofs that there are no such limits.”40 John Rogers similarly refers to 
Satan’s “vulgar empiricism,” even as he traces—in the best account to date—the 
rigorous logic underwriting Satan’s argument to be “self-raised, self-begot,” along 
with its possibly empirical basis.41 But “by representing Satan as lying about the 
fruit,” as Karen Edwards urges, “Milton shows that Satan has abused the potential 
of the new experimental philosophy for instilling wisdom – not that it has no such 
potential.”42  
 The critical dispute, to the extent that there is one, is not whether Satan 
is an empiricist, but whether he is a good one. By beginning in media res, Milton 
places front and center the disastrous consequences of what amounts to the first 
experiment (and the first “temptation”) in history. We do not yet know in Book 1 
how fully the angels conceive the war in heaven as a test of God’s might. We realize 
primarily that despite his loss, Satan claims to find comfort in what has been 
discovered in the process, “since through experience of this great event,” he cries, 
the fallen angels are “in foresight much advanc’t” (1.118-19). They have not 
achieved their ends to be sure, but they have not failed entirely either. Any 
experiment, mistaken or not, produces knowledge; the angels understand God’s 
nature better than they had, and thus “may with more successful hope resolve / 
To wage by force or guile eternal War” (1.120-21). An unsuccessful test is only an 
occasion for further testing in Satan’s reasoning. We might expect as much from 
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any scientist worth his salt. By the time of Paradise Regained millennia later, Satan’s 
optimism has waned, but his persistence has not. “So Satan, whom repulse upon 
repulse / Met ever,” Milton relates, “gives not o’er though desperate of success, / 
And his vain importunity pursues” (4.21-24). As an experimenter, Satan perfectly 
encapsulates Edison’s doctrine that scientific achievement is “one percent 
inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.”43 And yet, his relentless 
determination has been cited as the clearest evidence for his perversion of 
empirical reasoning. As Fried writes, “Satan remains ‘by success untaught’: he has 
absorbed none of the lessons.”44 In the place of genuine inquiry, he displays 
instead willful ignorance.  
 To better grasp the stakes and implications of Satan’s experiment in 
heaven, we must wait until Book 5. There we witness its formulation in much 
greater detail. Only by considering more carefully its design can we finally judge 
Satan’s relative success or failure and determine whether continued experiments, 
however “vain” and “importunate,” are either a perversion or an exemplar of the 
empirical method. When first encouraging disobedience, Satan counsels his fellow 
angels to question received wisdom:  
 
That we were form’d then say’st thou? and the work 
Of secondary hands, by task transferr’d 
From Father to his Son? strange point and new! 
Doctrine which we would know whence learnt: who saw 
When this creation was? remember’st thou 
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being? 
We know no time when we were not as now; 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d 
By our own quick’ning power, when fatal course 
Had circl’d his full Orb, the birth mature 
Of this our native Heav’n, Ethereal Sons. 
Our puissance is our own, our own right hand 
Shall teach us highest deeds, by proof to try  
Who is our equal: then thou shalt behold  
Whether by supplication we intend 
Address, and to begirt th’ Almighty Throne 
Beseeching or besieging. (5.853-69) 
 
His rhetoric, if not necessarily his logic, is perfectly in keeping with the spirit of 
empiricism that flourished in seventeenth-century England. He sounds a bit like 
Francis Bacon, who similarly complained in his Natural History (1622) that too 
often “authority is taken for truth, not truth for authority.”45 Satan proposes “by 
proof to try” doctrines held by the authorities—to try Authority itself, actually. To 
do so he very deliberately engineers an experiment. But in my opening 
qualification (‘if not necessarily his logic’) lies nearly everything. 
 At least since C. S. Lewis remarked that Satan, “being too proud to admit 
derivation from God, has come to rejoice in believing that he ‘just grew’ like Topsy 
or a turnip,” critics have questioned the logical consistency of Satan’s central 
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“heresy” of self-generation.46 For Lewis, the logic “produces as proof of his self-
existence what is really its disproof,” an exercise in utter “nonsense.”47 But while 
nearly everyone agrees on the crucial significance of this moment for Satan’s 
character and revolt, critics “have been curiously silent on the actual content of 
these lines,” as John Rogers notes.48 According to the animist materialism of 
Paradise Lost, Rogers demonstrates, to claim that the angels have grown by their 
“own quick’ning power” may not be so absurd at all. Milton’s monism, however, 
is not necessarily Satan’s.49 Instead of weighing the relative merits of his argument 
against the natural philosophy of Paradise Lost, we might also weigh those merits 
against the empirical framework Satan explicitly invokes.  
 As so often in Milton’s text, the crux of the argument is entangled in 
surprise. Satan’s rhetoric, not unlike his logic, is carefully designed to elicit a 
specific response from his auditors (and Milton’s readers). I do not deny that 
Satan’s claim is finally sophistical: in the blandest logical terms, it amounts to 
something like “not P, therefore Q.” But there is a devilish method in that 
sophistry, a cleverness lurking dangerously beneath the surface. He begins his 
diatribe with perfectly plausible questions, at least from an empirical perspective. 
If knowledge originates in experience, the angels might well wonder “whence 
learnt” this “strange point and new.” Who among them has experience of this 
creation, who remembers when the “Maker” gave them being, as God alleges to 
have done? Obviously, the answer is none. Our interest is piqued, as is theirs. Then 
comes the heresy. “We know no time when we were not as now;” he urges. Still on 
firm empirical ground, the link between knowledge and experience remains intact. 
Satan seems only to reformulate his earlier remark with this line, that none knows 
any time before their own existence, such that they might know the “Maker” to 
have made them. The semicolon at the end of this line helps to shape our 
expectation for what follows, implying a strong relation to what precedes. “Know 
none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d,” he continues in the following line. This 
appears to be a sufficiently reasonable extension of his previous claims: not only 
do we not know any time when we were made, we also know of no being(s) before 
us who was self-created. That is, we have no experience of such an event, when a 
prior being was “self-begot, self-rais’d.” 
 But this is not in fact what Satan argues, of course. It is what Satan should 
have argued, what we might expect him to argue as a “good” empiricist. Such a 
claim would have extended the doubt already cast on the act of creation to the 
status of the alleged creator. “Do we really believe that God is causa sui?” Satan 
might have insinuated. Instead, his logic runs something like this: we know none 
before us [hard-pause], hence we are self-begot by our own quickening power. In 
that pause, Satan implies a logical relation that is, to all appearances, specious. 
“What he means,” Fish writes in his 1997 preface, “is that his first creation (out 
of primordial matter or out of nothing) was self engineered by his ‘own quick’ning 
power’ (V.861), a conclusion he draws (absurdly) from the fact that he doesn’t 
remember being created by anybody else.”50 That the notion of self-generation 
follows as a conclusion from his lack of memory is only implied, however; it’s an 
impression of juxtaposition. And because of the enjambment at line 860, we have 
an equally strong, if only temporary, impression that Satan claims to have no 
Surprised	by	Science	
 Early	Modern	Culture	14	
 
14	
experience—and therefore no knowledge—of any being before him for which 
“self-existent” is an appropriate predicate. Both impressions linger. If one is clearly 
“absurd,” the other is not entirely without reason.  
 It is the potential relation between those two impressions that most 
reveals the cleverness of Satan’s argument, and may help to explain what would 
otherwise be an inexplicable effect. If Satan’s reasoning is so obviously absurd, 
how does it succeed in convincing all but Abdiel? Are we to believe that all the 
fallen angels are less sophisticated logicians than Milton’s readers? Satan’s 
argument actually breaks down into two stages. In the first half, from lines 853 to 
860, he aims primarily to question the preeminence of God and Christ. His 
method here is patently empirical. It works by persistently denying any experiential 
knowledge for God’s claims to have created the whole host of heaven. The second 
half, from lines 860 to 866, works at the self-promotion of Satan and the other 
angels (‘our puissance is our own’). These two strategies temporarily merge at the 
enjambment (lines 860-61), where for an instant both meanings will hang in 
contradictory suspension (i.e., that they know none self-created; and that they are 
themselves self-created). If Satan succeeds in convincing his fellow angels of his 
latter assertion that their puissance is their own, this conclusion will of course 
entail the former denials of God’s preeminence and power. The angels cannot be 
self-begot and created by God. But if Satan fails to convince others of his latter 
claim for self-derived power, it does not thereby entail the negation of the former, 
too. It is of course conceivable that the angels are not “self-rais’d” and yet still not 
created by God. Despite any possible charges of absurdity from listeners and 
readers, Satan is still justified, empirically if not morally speaking, to propose his 
experiment, his attempt “by proof to try” God’s power.  
 The issue with Satan’s empiricism is not logical absurdity. Here is the real 
problem that Satan faces with the specific experiment he has concocted. The war 
in heaven might indeed offer proof that God is not the “Almighty Maker,” in the 
event the rebels win. It cannot, even in such an event, prove that the angels are 
“self-raised,” though. There are still other possibilities this particular experiment 
cannot eliminate—that an as yet unknown being created everything and everyone, 
including God, for instance. But what if, on the other hand, the rebel angels lose? 
What does this prove? That God is the Almighty Maker? For a moment, Beelzebub 
at least thinks so. After the fall to hell, he says of their conqueror that “I now / Of 
force believe [him] almighty, since no less / Than such could have o’erpowered 
such force as ours” (1.143-45; emphasis mine). Beelzebub has fully, if somewhat 
mistakenly, internalized the logic of Satan’s bid for war in heaven, resting his 
conclusion that God is Almighty Maker (the question from the first half of Satan’s 
argument) on the self-promotion of Satan and his comrades (the second half of 
the argument). Only omnipotence could have defeated such a force as ours, he 
reasons. Unlike Beelzebub, however, Satan does not draw the same conclusion, 
resolving to wage eternal war as a continued test of God’s power. He thus “perverts” 
empiricism, Fried suggests, by “constantly refusing to acknowledge the resulting 
proofs that there are no such limits [to God’s power].”51 But it is Beelzebub, not 
Satan, who temporarily perverts the tenets of empiricism by ascribing more to the 
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experiment than reason would allow. The loss in heaven proves only that the 
angels have not succeeded in deposing God, not that God is impervious to assault. 
 Milton’s text thus exploits a problem implicit to the nature of 
experimental investigation, which can validate only (1) that things have happened, 
or (2) that they have not yet happened. Satan, it is true, fails to demonstrate in his 
siege on heaven that God is not Almighty as he had hoped to do, but he certainly 
does not thereby demonstrate that God is Almighty. That latter claim is impossible 
to validate empirically. No amount of experimentation, and no expanse of time, 
will ever demonstrate the proposition that “God cannot be defeated,” that his 
sovereignty is without limit. This explains why Satan, the arch-tempter, continues 
to try in Paradise Regained to thwart God, despite his countless failures. Each 
individual attempt, each reiteration of that archetypal experiment in heaven, can 
reveal at most that he still has not yet succeeded. For Satan to function in the text 
as a perversion of empiricism as Fried and others have claimed, he more likely would 
need to accept, as Beelzebub momentarily does, that God is the Almighty creator 
purely on the basis of his experiment, rather than by faith. What Paradise Lost really 
stages in the association between Satan and empiricism is the radical limitations of 
the latter. If Satan’s continued experiments are at some point laughable, it is only 
because he had hoped to prove, or to disprove, God’s preeminence in the first 
place. Not because he failed to accept the proof. 
 Satan, like Adam later, reaches too high. He endeavors to know with 
proof something that cannot be known by the standards of empirical reasoning. 
In effect, Paradise Lost pushes empiricism to its logical and unsettling conclusion. 
What Satan cannot experience by any number of experiments is the extent of God’s 
power. If he could ever confirm this power has no limit, any subsequent 
experiment would follow only from the willful ignorance Fried describes. But 
experience, as David Hume would later write, “only teaches us, how one event 
constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which 
binds them together, and renders them inseparable.”52 Satan challenges God, 
Satan fails. Even should he reiterate this pattern for all time, he could never know 
by experience the “necessary connection” between these events. Consequently, he 
cannot empirically predict the inevitability of his defeat, as Milton can by faith. 
That he continues to “give[] not o’er though desperate of success” so many years 
(and experiments) later in Paradise Regained is perhaps the best, if not also the most 
tragic, indication of his unfaltering commitment to an overly strict empiricism. For 
“there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, 
which is supposed to be exactly similar.”53 Each individual attempt reveals nothing 
more than the last. God’s power remains elusive, beyond the limits of experimental 
discovery. And so, Satan continues to experiment ad infinitum. He is, by his very 
nature, the arch-tempter. 
Satan’s empiricism and his experimental tendency to test the limits of 
God’s power, his ambition for knowledge and his desire for independence, link 
him firmly with Adam (and Eve) in Milton’s text. By extension, Paradise Lost links 
him to us as well. His very nature as the “tempter” is to test or to assay, to try or 
to experiment. Satan’s “original sin” is an experiment, an attempt to prove his 
hypothesis that God is not all-powerful. Likewise, Adam’s “original error,” his first 
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scientific mistake about the nature of celestial motions, is born of an ambition to 
reach beyond his station, a presumption to know things not within human 
comprehension. Just as Satan’s sin prefigures our own according to Milton’s text, 
Adam’s error likewise prefigures the rampant miscalculations of seventeenth 
century scientists—Gilbert, Kepler, and Galileo, among others. Given its rigidly 
providential view of history, Paradise Lost takes as one of its principle aims an 
exploration of the relations between past and future mistakes, both moral sins and 
cognitive errors. Only in such a scheme can Raphael, speaking with Adam at the 
outset of earth’s history, glimpse well into the future: “Already by thy reasoning, 
this I guess…” In Milton’s text, the greatest “advances” in science to date serve 
only to fulfill that original error.  
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